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I am grateful to Frank Stafford and Stefan Fölster for comments. 1. Introduction. Amenities or disamenities connected with different jobs are, in the labor economics literature, a source of compensating wage differentials. For an employer in a competitive labor market to attract labor for jobs with health risks, exposure to pollution or crowding etc., it is necessary to offer the worker a wage premium~/ Similarly, one can argue that workers may have emotionallinks to certain jobs which may force employers in other sectors to offer higher wages. For instance, workers are likely to have a preference for jobs offered at the place of birth and a wage premium above the one that covers the costs of moving is then necessary. Some workers might also have emotionallinks to specific jobs and therefore turn down offers of higher earnings from employers in other sectors. A case in point is handicraft workers who find a value in keeping up a tradition from previous generations.
If the emotionallink to the home region or a specific job is strong workers are unlikely to give up their job even if earnings fall. Areaction might be to share the total work time between the lower paid job having the amenity and another better paid but less prefered job. For instance, an artist who finds that earnings fall need not give up painting all together but instead accept a second, better paid, part time job. A plumber, on the other hand, who lacks emotionallinks to his trade might give up plumbing altogether if earnings fall and continue to have onIy one job in another business.
If some amenity generates double work it is not surprising that it is found more of ten in certain jobs than in others. Except for the most succesful ones, workers in the cultural sector, like musicians, painters and poets, and handicraft workers of ten have a second job to raise total earnings. Double work has also become increasingly popular in the primary sector like agriculture and fishery. In the next section, evidence on the increasing importance of part time agriculture in several countries are provided.
Since double work is increasing in several countries, it is justified to study the issue to contribute to our understanding of this phenomenon. I present first a number of theoretical explanations for double work. A common denominator for workers having two jobs is that one of the jobs has an inherent amenity. This amenity is a necessary condition for wage differentials and the connection to the theory of compensating wage differentials should therefore be obvious. Second, the paper presents an empirical test of the theoretical models presented. Here, data from the Swedish Level of Living Survey (LNU) are used and the models are applied to explain why Swedish agriculture has increasingly become a part time activity.
The paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 gives evidence on double work from the agricultural sector in some developed countries. In Section 3.a I present a general model of a utility maximizing worker who perceives an amenity to his job. In Section 3.b I present a "target income" model where workers have a preference for the sector with an amenity and in Section 3.c the target income model is expanded to allow for leisure. Section 4 contains an empirical application and Section 5 concludes the paper.
Evidence on Double Work from Agriculture.
Agriculture is a good example of a sector to which workers may have emotionallinks.
The transformation of the agriculturai sector in developed Western economies has led not only to a fall in the number of agriculturai workers but also to a tendency for agriculture to become a part time activity. The rising share of part time agriculturai production implies that the number of farmers falls considerably less than the total amount of hours of labor inputs in agriculture. Table 1. 1, for instance, shows the share of the agricultural work force that also participated in non-agricultural activities in the US for the seleeted years 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1987. The share of the workforce having other employments is the highest in the primary sectors. In 1988, 15.1 % of the workforce in agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing claimed that they had another employment while among the total workforce the average was 8.5 %. I shall present three different models that all have the feature that workers prefer a certain work. The emotionallinkage is represented by the inclusion in the utility function of the share of time spent in the sector where an amenity exists.
The chosen approach has connections with the migration literature, where choice of location enters the utility function, like Berg (1961) or, more recently, Hill (1986) . These studies, which had the purpose of explaining the share of work time spent in a foreign country, can, like the present paper, be looked upon as special cases of the more general literature of compensating wage differentials. In those studies, an amenity is derived from working at home.
Assume two sectors, one with jobs having some amenity and one traditional manufacturing sector with no amenity. These are called the a-sector and the m-sector.
Assume that an individual has a utility function U=U(X, a) where X is his commodity consumption and a is the share of his total available work time spent in the "amenity"
sector. U rises in both arguments. Consumption, X depends on the individual's earnings such that X=w m (1-a)+wSa. Here w m is the manufacturing earnings, w is earnings in the amenity sector and S==(l +s) where s is a subsidy rate provided by the government.
The individual agent takes w m and w to be fixed and the restriction wm>Sw holds~/
The maximization problem is formulated as:
O<a<1.
There are then two goods, X and a, with two prices 1 and (wm-Sw). Let n be the Lagrange function and ,\ the corresponding multiplier, the first order conditions are obtained as:
The first order conditions yield the matrix system:
The determinant, D, is positive and equals -Uxx(wm-wS) +2U xa (w m -wS) U aa .
Ishall first show the effects on the share of the work time spent in the amenity sector of an increase in the manufacturing wage. The effects on labor supply (Le., share of total work time) in the amenity sector are obtained as:
There is an ambiguous effect of an increase in manufacturing wages on part time work in the a-sector. In line with the Slutzky equation, the effect can be broken down into an income effect and a substitution effect. An increase in w m implies that the income level has increased. If amenity sector work is a normal good, there is a tendency to spend a larger share of total work time in the a-sector. The first term, D-l (l-a)(U ax -Uxx(wm-ws)), which is positive, captures the income effect.
On the other hand, as the manufacturing wage rises, consumption of amenity work becomes more costly since the price of amenity sector work, (wm-wS), rises.
Consequently, the individual spends alarger share of the work time outside the a-sector.
The substitution effect is in (3.8) captured by the negative term -A/D.
It should be noted that if the effect of an increase in w m is evaluated at a point where amenity sector participation is unity, Le., a=l, the effect is negative. Here, an increase in w m does not add to income since there is no manufacturing sector participation and therefore the only effect is a substitution effect. So, at this point the effect on the a-sector is unambiguously negative.
How is consumption of X affected? The comparative static effects of an increase in manufacturing wages are: (3.9)
As consumption of amenity work becomes more costly as the price of a-sector work, (wm-wS), rises there is substitution away from "consumption" of a and towards consumption of X. To this is added the income effect on X as w m rises. Both effects imply that consumption of X rises.
Performing the corresponding comparative static analysis for an increase in the wage in the amenity sector, the following effects obtains: (3.10) An increase in the a-sector wage unambiguously raises a, the share of total work time in the a-sector rises. The individual therefore becomes more specialized in a-production.
There is substitution toward spending more time in the a-sector since the price of a-work (w m -wS) has fallen. To this is added the income effect implied by the rise in the wage.
Turning to the effects on consumption of X as the a-wage rises, these are obtained as: (3.11) As the wage rises there is substitution away from consumption of X but the income effect counteracts the substitution leaving the net effect ambiguous.
Consider now the effects of an increase in S. An increase in S can be interpreted as a policy aiming at reducing the wage gap between manufacturing and the amenity sector earnings:
The subsidy gives incentives to a-sector workers to spend more work time in the a-sector. As for the increase in a-sector wages, there is substitution towards amen i t y work since its price has fallen. The subsidy also implies an income increase which further stimulates consumption of a. The subsidy unambiguously leads to increased specialization in amenity work.
Finally, the effects on X-consumption are:
The effect is ambiguous: an increase in the subsidy does not by necessity lead to increased consumption. While the subsidy raises incomes and hence stimulates consumption, it also stimulates an increase in the share of amenity work that lowers consumption. The effects are qualitatively, but not quantitatively, identical with an increase in the a-sector wage.
It would be natural to expand the model to allow for leisure. As this is done, no unambiguous results are derived. This should, though, be remembered in the evaluation of the empirical results. O<a<1.
The first order conditions are:
The following effects on a are obtained: (3.19) (3.20) (3.21 ) and (3.22 )
öX (wm-Sw) If the worker maximizes utility, given a certain level of X, it can be seen that, unlike the model in section 2, an increase in the manufacturing wage unambiguously raises the share of work in the a-sector. Ceteris paribus, the wage increase implies an income increase but the worker is assumed not to be interested in an income increase that raises X. As a response to the wage increase, he therefore shifts from manufacturing to a-sector work.
This process continues until the income level again yields the consumption level X.
An increase in the a-wage also increases a-sector work. With incomes unaffected at the new equilibrium, the only adjustment is again one from manufacturing to a-sector work. Surprisingly, the effects of increases in the two wages are qualitatively identical but generally differ quantitatively.
As in the earlier case an increase in the subsidy raises a: the subsidy stimulates specialization in a-sector production. An increase in the target income level, finally, lowers a. The intuition for this effect is clear: as the target income rises, the worker must spend less time in the low paying amenity sector to reach this level. The target income model yields no ambiguous results as the income level, at any new equilibrium point, is unchanged.
In the next section lintroduce leisure in the target income model. As this is shown to generate qualitatively different results it is justified to present the target income model with and without leisure.
3.c A Target Income Model with Leisure.
A natural extension of the above model is to allow for leisure. Unlike the case for the first model, the target income model with leisure yields some unambiguous results.
Allowing for leisure seems particularly important as it is reasonable to expect some adjustment of the total work time as a response to falling profitability. Here, it is assumed that the worker deterrnines a target income and af ter this has been reached, he determines the optimum choice of a-sector participation and leisure.
Assume that the total work time, T, is divided between leisure, L, work time in the a-sector, A, and work time in manufacturing, M so that T= L + A + M holds. Without loss of generality I assume that total time equals unity so that: The first issue to deal with is the effects on a of an increase in the manufacturing wage.
These are:
As in the general model, in equation (3.8), but unlike the target model without leisure as in (3.19) , there is an ambiguous effect of an increase in manufacturing wages. As the manufacturing wage rises, consumption of amenity work becomes more costly since (wm-wS) rises. With the introduction of leisure, the substitution effect reappears and there is a tendency to reduce the share of amenity work.
This general decrease in amenity sector part time work is, however, counteracted. With the increase in the manufacturing wage, there is a reduction of total work time since the target income implies that income should be unchanged. This implies that there is a decrease in the share of a-sector work (and an increase in leisure). The net effect is ambiguous.
As indicated above the effects on leisure are positive and obtained as: (3.31) With the altered prices, there is substitution away from "consumption" of a-sector work and towards consumption of leisure. As the income level remains constant at X and as the manufacturing wage rises there is a reduction of total work time which implies a further increase in leisure.
Performing the corresponding comparative static analysis for an increase in the a-sector wage, the following effects are obtained:
An increase in the a-wage unambiguously raises a, the share of total work time in the a-sector rises. The farmer therefore becomes more specialized in the a-sector. There is substitution toward spending more time in the a-sector since the price of a-work (w m -wS) has fallen. Furthermore, at an unchanged level of leisure, a-work increases at the expense of manufacturing work since the income level otherwise would rise above that implied by X.
Turning to the effects on consumption of leisure as the a-sector wage rises, these are obtained as: (3.33) öe
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As the a-wage rises there is substitution towards consumption of a-sector work since (wm-wS) falls. Ceteris paribus, this tends to reduce leisure (and manufacturing work).
There is therefore a negative effect involved in (3.33) . On the other hand, the target income can now be reached by a lower total work time which implies increased leisure so that the net effect is ambiguous.
Consider the effects of an increase in S to lower the wage gap:
The subsidy gives incentives to workers to spend more work time in the a-sector. Like for the increase in a-wages, there is substitution towards a-work since its price has fallen.
Ceteris paribus, the subsidy implies an income increase and, to reach exactly the target income, a-sector work is increased at the cost of manufacturing work.
Finally, the effects on leisure are:
The effect is ambiguous: an increase in the subsidy does not by necessity lead to increased leisure. Ceteris paribus, the subsidy raises incomes and to avoid a higher income than X, leisure is increased.
Finally, two more results are worth mentioning, both being the result of an increase in the t ar get income. The effects of an increase in the a-sector share of work time as X rises are:
As in Model 2, the effect is unambiguously negative. The introduction of leisure into the target income model does not alter the results in this respect. The effects on leisure are also negative: (3.37)
As can be expected the effect is unambiguous. An increase in the target income demands an increase in the share of time spent for work implying a reduction also of leisure. Implicit in (3.36) and (3.37) is also the result that the amount of work in manufacturing rises as the target income rises. Table 3 .1 summarizes all the results obtained in the three modeis. Can the rising wages in the manufacturing sector explain the decrease in the share of work time spent in the a-sector? As the manufacturing wage increases the first and the third models yielded indeterminate effects on the a-sector participation rate while the target model without leisure yielded a positive effect on a-sector work. Only to the extent that the first or third model is the relevant one and if the income effect dominates the substitution effect can higher manufacturing wages explain the rise in participation in manufacturing activities.
It can also be noted that introducing leisure in the target income model may yield a shift in the effects on a-sector participation of an increase in manufacturing wages. af/ax n.a. n.a.
Can the fall in a-sector wages explain the fall in the share of time in the amenity sector? All three models indicate that a lower a-sector wage unambiguously lowers time in a-sector. It is noteworthy that the effects of an increase in manufacturing wages and a decrease in a-sector wages are unexpectedly asymmetrical in Model 2, and in Models 1 and 3 symmetrical or asymmetrical depending on which effect that dominates.
Concerning the policy consequences income policies to lower the wage gap yield increases in a-sector participation in all modeis. Column 2 can be used to evaluate Model 2. Positive effects on amenity sector participation of both wages should be expected and a negative effect of X. Both wages yield estimates of the unexpected sign while consumption, X, yields an estimate of the expected sign which furthermore is significant. Model 2 has therefore been given on ly a modest support in the regressions.
To evaluate Model 3, consider columns 2 and 3. This model predicts that amenity sector work is positively affected by the agricultural wage. However, the regressions yielded a negative effect. The estimate is not significantly different from zero. The estimated negative effeet of an increase in the non-agricultural wage is, however, eonsistent with Model 3. The negative effeet implies that the substitution effeet dominates the ineome effeet.
The estimated effeet on leisure of agriculturai wages is not signifieant. Manufaeturing wage inereases should raise leisure aeeording to the model, and the regressions show that they do. As eonsumption rises leisure is expeeted to fall and there is an estimated negative effeet of eonsumption. These regressions lend some support to Model 3.
5. Conclusions.
I have specified three models to explain the rising share of double work. In the first model the worker maximized utility by determining eonsumption of goods and the share of his work time spent in a seetor with jobs having an amenity. In the seeond he maximized utility by determining time in the amenity seetor af ter having reached a target ineome level. The third model added leisure to the target ineome model. I foeus on the individual's behavior and no eeonomy wide, or general equilibrium, eonsiderations are analyzed. Only "first order" effeets are studied.
From a theoretical point of view the models yielded some unexpeeted effeets. For instanee, as the wage outside the amenity job sector rises this does not produee the same effeet as when the wage in the amenity seetor falls. Henee, an asymmetry is present. The seeond model yielded an increase in amenity sector participation of inereases in both the a-seetor wage and the manufacturing seetor wage. AIso, in several respects the models produce counteraeting effects.
The empirical work showed that, in general, higher incomes and higher wages outside the a-seetor are important determinants of the fall in a-sector participation. Not
